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Introduction
Higher returns earned by small stocks and high book-to-market (B/M) stocks have been a subject of intense academic enquiry. Majority of asset pricing research attributes this phenomenon to high distress risk of these stocks (see, Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1992) . Ferguson and Shockley (2003) argue that true equity beta of a firm is a weighted average of its covariance with the economy's equity claims and debt claims.
Their theoretical model shows that the usual method of using an equity market index as a proxy for the market portfolio will underestimate true equity betas, and this underestimation is a function of the sensitivity of the firm's equity to the omitted debt claims in the economy. They argue that these estimation errors are more severe for firms with higher leverage and for firms which are distressed. Further, any factor such as size and B/M that proxy leverage and distress risk will compensate for underestimated equity betas and would be able to explain the stock returns. Ferguson and Shockley's (2003) prediction that market betas of distressed stocks are too low and that this underestimation is correlated with leverage and distress risk has following implications: (i) positive CAPM alphas on small size and high B/M stocks observed in empirical studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1993 and 1996) should be positively correlated to leverage and financial distress, (ii) a model with more direct proxies of sensitivity to debt claims such as leverage and distress risk will outperform Fama and French (1993) model, (iii) factor loadings on SMB (the factor mimicking size effect) and HML (the factor mimicking B/M effect) should be positively correlated with the factor loadings on more direct proxies, and (iv) the explanatory power of SMB and HML will decline once they are orthogonalised with respect to more direct proxies for leverage and distress risk.
In testing their model, Ferguson and Shockley construct a direct proxy for distress risk using Altman's (1968) z-score. However, the validity of their model and results are questionable. First, whilst their model assumes that the distressed stocks earn higher returns than non-distressed stocks, their own empirical findings as well as those reported in the literature (e.g., Dichev, 1998; Campbell et al., 2008; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008a) , point to the contrary. Second, given that they construct their distress factor as the difference between the returns on non-distressed and distressed stocks, distressed stocks should show a lower exposure to their distress factor. However, their finding that distressed stocks show a higher exposure to their distress factor is counterintuitive.
Using UK data from 1979 to 2006, this paper examines whether the observed size and book to market effects in stock returns are driven by estimation errors in equity betas due to omitted debt claims from the equity only market portfolio. We find CAPM alphas are positively correlated to leverage and distress factors suggesting a systematic downward bias in estimated betas of highly leveraged firms and distressed firms. We also find SMB and HML factor loadings are positively correlated to distress and leverage factor loadings respectively suggesting SMB could be proxying for distress risk while HML could be proxying for leverage. We show that negative returns on the distress factor (a common finding in the literature) lead to poor performance of the Ferguson and Shockley (2003) model as compared to the Fama and French (1993) model. This suggests that higher returns on small stocks and high B/M stocks are not compensation for higher distress risk. 3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the theory and method, section 3 explains the data used, section 4 discusses the empirical results, and the concluding section, section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the study.
Theory and Method
The theoretical model of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) is quite intuitive. The market portfolio of CAPM can be considered to be composed of two sub portfolios: one with all equity claims in the economy and the other with all debt claims. The covariance of a firm's equity claim with the market portfolio will then be a weighted average of the covariance of the firm's equity claims with the two sub portfolios. Simple algebraic manipulation then shows that the true beta of a firm is:
Where:
Variance of market portfolio returns.
Rearranging equation (1) gives (Ferguson and Shockley, 2003:2550) :
Equation (2) shows that there are two sources of error in the market beta estimated using the equity only proxy, the scaling error ( 1   ) and firm specific error
). The debt beta will be higher for firms with higher leverage and/or higher risk of financial distress and therefore, the estimated equity beta of such firms will be more severely biased downwards. It is important to consider the risk of financial distress as well because given the same leverage, the debt beta (estimated beta) of firms at higher risk of failure will be higher (lower). Downward biased estimated betas will generate lower expected returns leading to upward biased CAPM intercepts. Hence, the first implication of the model is that CAPM intercepts will be positively related to leverage and financial distress.
The firm specific error term also implies that factors that capture leverage and financial distress will provide a correction for the downward bias in estimated equity betas and appear to explain stock returns. Smaller firms are more exposed to risk of failure and hence, SMB may be deriving its explanatory power from its link to financial distress. We can decompose B/M ratio into (Fama and French, 1992:444) :
Where: BVE = Book value of equity, MVE = Market value of equity, and BVD = Book value of debt.
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The first term on RHS of equation (3) 
where:
R it is the value weighted return on portfolio i during month t, R Ft is the 1-month T-bill rate at the beginning of month t, RMRF t is the difference between the value-weighted return of all the stocks in the sample during month t and R Ft , SMB t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor during month t, HML t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor during month t, NMP t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the z-score factor during month t, DE t is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the leverage factor during month t, and ε it is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
If higher returns on small stocks and high B/M stocks are due to their higher distress risk, we would expect such stocks to load more heavily on NMP and DE factors, and that inclusion of these factors would either drive out SMB and HML (if NMP and DE are perfect proxies for distress risk) or at least reduce their explanatory power (if NMP and DE are imperfect proxies for distress risk). In addition, the three factor model of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) should produce lower pricing errors than both, the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model, and the five factor model should produce smaller pricing errors than both the three factor models.
We use the Gibbons et al. (1989) F-statistic to test whether the regression intercepts for the test assets are jointly zero. Gibbons et al. (1989) show that: 
Data

Sample Selection
The study covers all non financial UK stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange The factor mimicking the returns on distress factor (NMP) and leverage factor (DE) are constructed as follows: on the 30 th of September of each year, all stocks in the portfolio are ranked on z-score and grouped into two portfolios, one with negative zscore stocks (N) and the other with positive z-score stocks (P). Independently, the stocks are sorted on their debt-equity ratio and grouped into three portfolios, one with lowest 30% (L), one with highest 30% (H) and one with middle 40% (M) of the stocks.
Six portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the two z-score and three leverage portfolios. Monthly value weighted returns are calculated on each of the portfolios and the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each September. Factor NMP is constructed as the difference between the equally weighted average of returns on the three negative z-score portfolios and the three positive z-score portfolios. 6 Factor DE is constructed as the difference between the equally weighted average of returns on the two highest leverage portfolios and the two lowest leverage portfolios. Table 3 here
Results
Summary Statistics
Time-Series Regressions
In this sub-section, we report the results of time series regressions on the 25 size and B/M portfolios using equation (4). These regressions provide a test of whether the leverage and distress factors have a role in explaining stock returns. . 12 This provides evidence that the CAPM betas estimated using equity only market portfolio are more severely underestimated for distressed portfolios. Table 5 here
Single Factor Model, Three Factor Model, and Stock Returns
Distress Factor and Stock Returns
The theoretical model of Ferguson and Shockley (2003) predicts that addition of distress and leverage factors to the CAPM will provide a better description of stock returns than the Fama and French (1993) model. Accordingly, inclusion of these factors should increase the expected returns on relatively distressed stocks (i.e. small stocks and high B/M stocks), and thus reduce the pricing errors observed in table 4. 
and 
Summary of results
Conclusions
Ferguson and Shockley (2003) develop a model that provides theoretical justification
for explaining the observed size and book-to-market (B/M) effects in stock returns to the omitted debt claims in the equity only proxy for the market portfolio. In this paper, using UK data, we test the predictions of their model and find mixed results. Consistent with their prediction that the CAPM betas are systematically underestimated for distressed firms and those with higher leverage, we find CAPM alphas have a strong positive correlation with both distress risk and leverage. High correlations between the loadings on the distress and leverage factors with loadings on SMB and HML respectively are also consistent with their predictions as they suggest that SMB and HML could be acting as proxies for distress risk and leverage.
However, we find no evidence that their model outperforms the Fama and French (1993) model. In fact, we find that anomalously low returns on the NMP factor leads to larger, not smaller, pricing errors. Our results also show that both SMB and HML carry additional information to that contained in NMP and DE and vice-versa. One possible explanation for this result is that both SMB and NMP are imperfect proxies for distress risk and DE and HML are imperfect proxies for leverage and hence they retain The results here and those in previous literature cast doubt on the hypothesis that the Fama and French (1993) factors represent the correction for underestimated market betas using an equity only proxy for the market portfolio.
Notes:
1 Even if SMB and HML derive their explanatory power only from their relation with leverage and distress, they may still not be subsumed by more direct proxies if the later are also imperfect. In this case, SMB and HML may capture residual effects and remain significant. This treatment is consistent with that of Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) .
In the UK, it is very rare for shareholders to receive anything once the firm goes into bankruptcy process.
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This is consistent with the spirit of Fama and French factors since it is constructed as the difference in returns on high risk and low risk portfolios.
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We use double sort for NMP and DE because financial distress risk and leverage are not independent.
In our sample, while about 50% of the high leverage stocks have negative z-scores, only about 10% of the low leverage stocks have negative z-scores (see table 2, panel F). However, we have repeated our tests using factor mimicking portfolios based on single sorts and the results are qualitatively the same.
The results are not reported here to save space and are available from the first author.
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Ferguson and Shockley find that while the distress factor is positively correlated to HML, it is negatively correlated with SMB.
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The failure rates for the two largest size portfolios are uninformative as the largest 40% of the stocks only have 6% (14) 14 GRS F test rejects the null hypothesis of all intercepts being jointly zero at the 1% level of significance. RMRF is the difference between value-weighted returns of all stocks in the analysis and 1-month T-Bill rate, SMB is the factor mimicking size effect, and HML is the factor mimicking B/M effect in stock returns. NMP is the factor mimicking z-score effect (distress factor) while DE is the factor mimicking D/E effect (leverage factor). All the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of September each year from 1979 to 2005. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last monthly return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. The six z-score and leverage portfolios are formed as follows: on the 30 th of September of each year, all stocks in the portfolio are ranked on z-score and grouped into two portfolios, one with negative z-score stocks (Z<0) and the other with positive z-score stocks (Z>0). Independently, the stocks are sorted on their debt-equity ratio and grouped into three portfolios, one with lowest 30% (Low), one with highest 30% (High) and one with middle 40% (Medium) of the stocks. Six portfolios are then formed at the intersections of the two z-score and three leverage portfolios. Panels A to G report the time-series averages over the sample period. (1993) 25 size and B/M portfolios are formed as in Fama and French (1993) with rebalancing at the end of September each year from 1979 to 2005. R i is the monthly value weighted return on portfolio i, and R F is the one-month T-bill rate at the beginning of the month. RMRF is the difference between monthly value weighted return on all stocks in the portfolios and R F . Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. 25 size and B/M portfolios are formed as in Fama and French (1993) with rebalancing at the end of September each year from 1979 to 2005. R i is the monthly value weighted return on portfolio i, and R F is the one-month T-bill rate at the beginning of the month. RMRF is the difference between monthly value weighted return on all stocks in the portfolios and R F . SMB is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor and HML is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor in stock returns. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. Twenty-five size and B/M portfolios are formed as in Fama and French (1993) with rebalancing at the end of September each year from 1979 to 2005. R i is the monthly equally weighted return on portfolio i, and R F is the one-month T-bill rate at the beginning of the month. RMRF is the difference between monthly value weighted return on all stocks in the portfolios and R F . NMP is the return on the mimicking portfolio for z-score factor and DE is the return on the mimicking portfolio for leverage factor in stock returns. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. Twenty-five size and B/M portfolios are formed as in Fama and French (1993) with rebalancing at the end of September each year from 1979 to 2005. R i is the monthly equally weighted return on portfolio i, and R F is the one-month T-bill rate at the beginning of the month. RMRF is the difference between monthly value weighted return on all stocks in the portfolios and R F . SMB is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the size factor, HML is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the B/M factor, NMP is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the z-score factor and DE is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the leverage factor in stock returns. Negative B/M stocks are excluded. The last period return for failed stocks is set equal to -100%. 
